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Abstract- In optical sensor networks, the adversary can inject false reports and old packets, both of 
which can cause false alarms and drain out the limited energy of the network. Existing security 
mechanisms can detect and filter out only false reports but not the old packets during forwarding. 
Furthermore, they cannot resist cooperative attacks. A MAC and one-way function based Filtering 
Scheme (MOFS) was presented. Each node distributes its key and initial hash value to some other 
nodes after deployment. A data report must carry the MACs and fresh hash values from t detecting 
nodes. The forwarding nodes check the logicality of the relative position of the detecting nodes carried 
in the report, the correctness of the MACs and hash values, and the freshness of these hash values. 
Analysis and simulation results show that MOFS can not only filter false reports and old packets 
simultaneously, but also performs well on compromise toleration. 
 
Index terms: Optical sensor networks; false reports; out-dated packets; MAC; one-way function. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Optical sensor networks (OSNs) are widely used in many important fields including military 
surveillance, habitat monitoring and health care [1]. The sensor nodes with limited resources are 
usually deployed in hostile environments. In such circumstances, the security of sensors is of 
essential importance. Once a node is compromised by the adversary, all the secret information 
would be disclosed and thus can be abused to launch false report injection attacks [2], or replayed 
data injection attacks [3], i.e., to inject outdated reports into sensor networks. Defending the 
aforementioned attacks in WSNs is very important, because these illegitimate data not only cause 
false alarms but also may drain out the constrained resources of the sensors. 
In recent years, some researches focused on preventing such false data and replayed data 
injections [4-15]. The feature of them is to attach t MACs (Message Authentication Codes) or 
time stamp to each report, and rely on intermediate nodes to verify the correctness. These 
schemes work well when only little compromised nodes existed in the network, while if more 
than t nodes are compromised, the attacker can then exploiting the fetched secrets to fake out un-
realizable false data reports. Moreover, the attacker can also inject outdated data into the network 
without being detected en-route. 
As illustrated in Fig. 1, here we assume that the adversary has compromised five nodes A1, … , 
A5. When the security threshold is set to five and the attacker fake a false report R:(e, M1, M2, M3, 
M4, M5), and then send it to the neighbor nodes, then R would not be filtered out. This is because 
all MACs included in the report are correct and thus cannot be detected. Moreover, if the attacker 
exploits the compromised node A5 to inject the outdated report R0 into the network, then the 
forwarding nodes are also not able to detect, which cause the waste of energy. 
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Fig. 1  False and outdated reports injections in WSN 
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In this paper, we presented a MAC and one-way function based filtering scheme named MOFS. 
The sensors use the function to generate a one-way hash chain, and then transmit the neighbor 
information and initial hash value to some intermediate nodes. Each report should carry the ID, 
hash value and MAC of t nodes which sensing the event simultaneously. The forwarding nodes 
then verify the logicality of the sensors’ locations, the correctness of MACs, and both the 
correctness and freshness of the hash value, and thus to filter out false data and outdated data 
simultaneously. 
 
II. RELATED WORK 
 
Ye et al. firstly discussed about the problem of false data filtering in the Optical sensor networks, 
and presented a mechanism called SEF [3]. SEF divide the overall key pool into n partitions, and 
every partition includes m secret keys. Every node chooses a partition before deployment 
randomly, and then selects arbitrary k keys from the partition to store. After detecting the event, 
multiple nodes detecting the event simultaneously generate a report including t different MACs 
collaboratively. In the process of transmitting the data package, the intermediate node which 
owes the same key partition with the detection node can check up an MAC in the data package 
using a probability of k / m. All the false packages which sneak filtering would be filtered by sink 
finally. However, SEF has two severe problems. First, if a compromised node caches some legal 
data and injects a large number of copies into the network, then these copies would all be 
transmitted to sink, leading to a waste of energy. Second, if the attacker obtains t different key 
partitions arbitrarily, then he can fabricate false package which can’t be distinguished. 
Ma et al. put forward a sink verifying method, called REFE [4]. In the RSFS, all nodes and sink 
form the star topology, among which the cluster heads with stronger performance than the 
ordinary nodes gather data, and the gathering result should consist of all MACs produced by all 
detecting nodes. After accepting the gathering result, sink check the gathering result and the 
MACs, thereby filtering out the false data. This method isn’t be restricted by safe threshold t, but 
false data can’t be filtering out by transmitting nodes; therefore it isn’t good for saving energy in 
the sensor network. In addition, some nodes dying or some new nodes joining the network would 
all lead to the change of the topology of the network, therefore the RSFS scheme, which only is 
suitable for the specific star topology, is not suitable for the actually deployed WSNs. 
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Yang et al. [5] proposed a statistical en-route filtering scheme based on multi-dimensional called 
MDSEF. Differ to the ordinary en-route filtering based on one dimension, the scheme divides an 
overall key pool into multiple sub-sets; each includes several key groups. After being deployed, 
each node can join a group in each set and randomly select some keys from these groups. This 
method can greatly improve the performance of covering probability and filtering effectiveness, 
without losing the resilience against nodes compromising. It then presented an axis-rotation 
based algorithm to associate multiple sets with the detecting terrain. Finally, a distributed 
stepwise refinement group joining algorithm is also applied for selecting groups. However, both 
the group joining algorithm and axis-rotation based algorithm lead to huge energy consumption 
for energy limited WSN. 
Naresh et al. [6] pioneered an active filtering scheme for false data called AEFS to cope with 
false data injection attacks and DoS attacks simultaneously in WSN. Each node was firstly 
initialized with a hash chain. It then distributes its verifying key to some intermediate nodes. 
After sending a data report, the sensing nodes all immediately disclose their keys, enabling the 
forwarding nodes to check the corresponding reports. The scheme uses a so-called Hill Climbing 
algorithm to distributing keys with which the nodes lies closer to the source possess stronger 
filtering capacity than others. Furthermore, AEFS utilizes the actual property of broadcasting in 
wireless communications to deal with DoS attacks. The scheme is able to identify and filter out 
false data earlier with a low requirement in memory and computing. However, the Hill Climbing 
method also incurs a huge communication cost. 
Bashir et al. [7] researched on the duplicate data elimination problem in hybrid RFID- sensor 
networks named RDFS. They thought that RFID data includes much duplication. The 
transmitting of RFID data through multiple hops toward sink will lead to extra energy 
consumption which is unnecessary and thus decreasing the network’s lifecycle. The proposed 
scheme used a clustering mechanism and authorized cluster heads to eliminate duplicate data and 
forward filtered data towards the sink node. As a result, it can eliminate duplicated data 
effectively. Theoretical analysis and simulations illustrate that RDFS outperforms existing en-
route filtering schemes on both filtering efficiency and energy consumption, but the adapted time 
synchronization technique isn’t appropriate for wireless sensor network with limited energy. 
Yang et al. [6] presented an en-route filtering scheme based on polynomials named PCREF. 
After deployed, all nodes in the scheme are grouped into some clusters. After that, according to a 
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pre-defined probability, each of them is assigned an authenticated polynomial and a checking 
polynomial. The authenticated polynomial is used to endorse the report and the checking 
polynomial is for verifying the accepted report, respectively. Different initiative polynomials will 
be adopted in different clusters. Compared with the aforementioned schemes which use MACs to 
endorse reports, polynomials based technique enables PCREF to achieve a better filtering 
capability. 
Yang et al. [10] thought that the symmetric key technique is not safe enough for WSN and firstly 
tried to adopting asymmetric key technique on filtering false reports. The proposed CCEF 
scheme is based on commutative cipher, in which the source node establishes a secret association 
with sink, while all intermediate nodes using the witness key to verify the data reports without 
having to know the original session key. CCEF achieves a stronger protection against symmetric 
key based schemes. Ren et al. [12] proposed a LEDS scheme which exploiting the location-aware 
character of sensor networks to protect the security of data in WSN. The location-aware end-to-
end security not only guarantees node-to-node verification through the package forwarding 
routes, but also can ensure an efficient en-route filtering capacity; however it is only suitable for 
some particular network routings. 
To defending outdated data, Perrig et al. put forward the SNEP and µTESLA algorithms to check 
up outdated data in the SPINS protocol. µTESLA arithmetic assigns a hash function in advance 
for every node before deployment. Sink owes the whole information of all secrets. After 
detecting an event, the sensing nodes using the hash function to adores the sensing data, and send 
the result to the destination node. Both sides can update the counters and prepare transmission in 
the next time. Chen et al. proposed a scheme based on the time synchronization technique, TSPC
 
[14]. Its basic ideology is that the side of sending inset time-poke information in every data 
package and sink distinguish outdated data through checking up the accuracy of time-poke. 
Recent study indicates that the synchronization technique and public secret key technique have 
higher requirement on calculating and storage capability, and thus is difficult to apply to limited-
performance wireless sensor network directly 
[2, 3]
. However, the symmetrical secret key 
technique has many advantages, such as easy realization and low calculation complexity. It is 
possible the only one technique of data encryption which can be applied to sensor networks. 
Existing methods basing on technique of symmetrical secret key, such as SEF, RSF, MDSEF, 
RDFS, PCREF and so on, can’t check up the freshness of the data, so they can’t check outdated 
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package which is sent by compromise panel point. The deal such as SPINS, TSPC and so on 
can’t check up and filter the outdated package in the transmission. This article mainly discusses 
how to filter out the false package and outdated package in the sensor network at the same time. 
 
III. THE MOFS SCHEME 
 
a. System model 
 
Assume the sensors are distributed in a high density, such that each stimulus can be sensed by 
more than t sensor nodes simultaneously. They elect one of the nodes as the Center-of-Stimulus 
(CoS) [3] in a collaborative manner. We also assume that all detecting nodes belong to the 
neighbors of the CoS. The CoS then gathers t MACs and summarizes them to produce a data 
report. The data report is then forwarded toward the sink node through multiple hops.  
The sink has strong self-protection, computation and storage capabilities, and possesses all secret 
information of the network, including the keys, hash values and relative positions of nodes. Sink 
can filter out all false and outdated reports that finally transmitted to. 
We also assume that the network has a short time period of safe bootstrapping after deployed, 
during this period each node is safe to distribute its information without being compromised.  
 
b. Deployment and bootstrapping 
 
There is a global secret pool G={Ki:0≤ i ≤W -1}, and every node Ai randomly selects a different 
key to store. In addition, we pre-assign each node a random data µi and a one-way function £ 
which has the features of one-way and irreversible, i.e., for a given input parameter a, it is easy to 
calculate £(a)=b, but it is impossible to introduce a from b [15]. 
Next, each node Ai can produce a one-way hash chain according to steps as follows. First, 
calculating the value of £(xi) = y1, £
2
(xi) = £(y1) = y2,…, £
u
(xi) = £(yu-1) = yu  successively. Second, 
naming every value of above in reverse direction, i.e. commanding hi
u 
= y1, hi
u-1 
= y2,…, hi
1 
= yu , 
therefore we can obtain a one-way chain Hi = hi
1
,hi
2
,…, hi
u
. In order to reduce expenses of 
storage, each node could only store a part of the hash values in the chain, such as no. k, no.2k…, 
and calculate the other values on the basis of equation 1 by these storing values. 
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i
jqj
i qjhh
ji   (1) 
After deployment, every node Ai produces a data package {Ai, Ki , hi
1
} including node ID, secret 
key and hash value which has the smallest index value, and broadcasts the package locally. After 
obtaining the broadcasting message, node Ai produces a note package: {Ai, Aa1, …, Aaj, Ki, Ka1, 
…, Kaj; hi
1
, ha1
1
, …, haj
1
}, where Aaj signifies the ID of Ai’s neighbors, Kaj signifies the secret key 
stored in Aaj, and haj
1
 signifies the hash value which has the smallest index value, respectively. 
Next, each node Ai builds a transmission path to sink, Path(Ai) ={Ai, A1, …, Ad, sink}, and sends 
the note message to sink. Finally, Ai deletes the hash value hi
1
 in the hash chain. 
 
note
Ak
Ax2
Ax3
Ax4
Ax5
A A1
(Ax2, Kx2, hx2
1)
(Ax4, Kx4, hx4
1)
Ax1
sink
 
Fig. 2 Distribution of keys and hash values 
After accepting the note package, node Ak (1≤ k ≤ d) selects out the neighbor information of Ai 
and stores it using a form as follows: N(Ai)={Aa1， …， Aaj}, and to be elected as a confirmation 
node of Ai using probability ck / c0, here ck signifies the hops between Ak and sink, c0 signifies the 
hops between A0 and sink, respectively. If Ak is a confirmation node of Ai, it then selects a node 
Aax(1≤ x ≤ j) randomly from the note package and stores its information, then deletes the 
information from the note package. Otherwise, Ak forwards the note package directly. Fig. 2 
provides the process of distributing secret keys and hash values. 
 
c. Generation of reports 
 
After an event occurred, all detecting nodes joining up to select a CoS. Cos will send its 
perception e to every detecting node. When accepting the data e, each detecting node will 
compare the perception value of itself to e. If the error is within some given threshold value, it 
then selects a secret key Ki to encrypt e and produces a message authentication code Mi:Ki(e). 
Next, each detecting node sends its ID number, MAC, hash value which has the smallest index 
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number and index to Cos, and deletes the used hash value at the same time. Cos collects the 
information of another t-1 detecting nodes to produce a report. For example, assuming A1, A2, …, 
At are checking up an event e together, while A1 is Cos, then the produced report is like this, R:{e; 
A1， …， At; q1， …， qt; h1
q1， …， ht
qt
; M1， …， Mt}, here Aj signifies the node ID and qj 
(1≤ j ≤ t) signifies the hash value index. Next, CoS will send the data report R to the node in the 
next forwarding hop. 
 
d. Filtering on forwarding 
 
After accepting the data package R, the intermediate node Ai first checks up whether the ID, hash 
value, number of MACs carried in the data package meet the requirements. It then judges the 
logic of all nodes’ relative positions. At last, it checks up the correctness of MACs, the 
correctness and freshness of hash values, respectively. The detailed confirmation process is as 
follows: 
Step 1: check up whether R including t node IDs, hash values, indexes and MACs. 
Step 2: if not stored the neighbor information of A1, abandoning R. 
Step 3: check up whether every node A2, … , At are neighbors of A1. 
Step 4: if stored the key Kv of certain node Av(1≤ v ≤ t) , calculates M again through Kv and 
compares it to Mv. if M is equal to Mv ,abandoning R. 
Step 5: if stored the hash value hv
qd
 of certain node Av(1≤ v ≤ t), compares the index qv to qd . 
If qv is less than qd, signifies the hash value hv
qv
 as un-fresh. Otherwise, judges whether hv
qd 
is 
equal to £
qv-qd
(hv
qv
), if hv
qd  
is equal to £
qv-qd
(hv
qv
), displaces the stored hash value hv
qd
 of hv
qv
. 
Step 6: if all of the above confirmations are successful, transmits R to the next hop. 
Fig. 3 illustrates the pseudo-code of filtering on forwarding. 
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Fig.3   the pseudo-code of en-route filtering. 
 
e. Example of en-route filtering 
 
As illustrated in Fig.4, we assume that the transmitting path from a certain source A1 to sink is 
denoted as: Path(A1)={A1, A6, A7, A8, sink}, where A2, …, A5 are all neighbors of A1. We further 
assume that A6 owns the key K1 and hash value h1
1
 for A1, while node A7 has the key K2 and hash 
value h2
1
 for A2. When t is equal to 5, we illustrate the procedure of verifying outdated and false 
reports. 
R0 R1
A8
A2
A5
A4
K1, h1
1
K2, h2
1
e A7
A6A3
A1 sink
 
Fig. 4   an example of en-route filtering 
 
We first discuss the verification of legitimate reports. Assuming a data report R0 for an event e 
denoted by {e; A1, …, A5; q1, …, q5; h1
2
, …, h5
2
; M1, …, M5}, is generated by A1 combining with 
other detecting nodes A2,…, A5. R0 is then sent to node A6. After accepting R0, A6 checks whether 
/* Upon receiving a data report R */  
 
1. Check that t {Av, Mv, hv
qv
} tuples exist in R. 
2. Check from the pre-stored neighbor information table, if it has not stored the 
neighbor information for A1, drop R otherwise. 
3. Check the t -1 node IDs {Av, 2≤v≤t} all belong to the neighbor set of 
A1:N(A1). 
4. If it has one key K∈ {Kv,1≤v≤t},it computes M=K(e) and see if the 
corresponding Mv is the same as M. 
5. If it has stored one hash value hv
qd
, drop R if qv ≤ qd is true. Otherwise it then 
checks if hv
qd 
= £
qv-qd
(hv
qv
) is true, if true, then it updates the stored hash 
value to hv
qd
. 
6. Forward R. 
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the numbers of node IDs, hash values, the corresponding indices, and 5 MACs are all 5 in the 
report. Actually, each intermediate node has to execute the above mentioned verification step and 
it is going to be omitted it in later text. It then examines if the index of the included hash value 
h1
2
 is larger than the pre-stored one h1
1
. It also checks whether the equation h1
1
=F(h1
2
) is true. 
Furthermore, it re-produces a MAC using the stored K1 and compares the result with the 
corresponding one in the report. If all the above verification processes are successful, R0 is then 
sent to A7. The hash value stored in node A6 is updated to h1
2
accordingly. In the later phases, 
nodes S7 and S8 execute the verification procedure similarly, and update the stored hash value in 
node S7 to h2
2
. Finally, R0 is successfully passed to sink. 
We then depict the authentication of outdated reports. We assume some compromised node A6 is 
about to transmit a cached report R0 to A7. As A7 has already updated its stored hash value to h2
2
 
in the last verification phase, it is able to detect h2
2
 included in R0 is un-fresh, and thus to drop R0. 
We finally talk about the verification of false data. We assume A1 、 A3 、 A4 、 A5 are 
compromised and are abused to fake a false report R1which contains the faked MAC and hash 
value of A2. Obviously, when A7 receives the package, it can find that the included M2 and h2
2
 are 
all faked because it had already pre-stored the key and hash value of A2. Finally, R1 is dropped by 
A7. 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND SIMULATIONS 
 
a. The capability of anti-compromise 
 
In the existing schemes such as SEF, the intermediate nodes only check up validity of the 
attached MACs in the data package, so after attacking arbitrarily t nodes ( e.g., A1，…，A5 in 
Fig. 5), the adversary is able to fake unrecognized false package. While MOFS judges whether 
every node belonging to the neighbors of CoS to check up the logic of all detecting nodes’ 
positions, thus is able to prevent nodes from different areas to fake package together in a 
collaborative manner. For example, assuming the attacker has compromised nodes from different 
areas A1，…，A5, and abused A1 to fake a false package R:{E; A1， A2， …， A5; M1， M2， 
…， M5}, and further to send it into the network. After accepting R, if stored the neighbor 
information of A1 , the forwarding node can judge that A2 is not the neighbor of A1 and 
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abandoning R. Otherwise, if had not stored the neighbor information of A1, the forwarding node 
signifies that R isn’t a package produced by the correct source node and also to abandon it 
accordingly. 
Theorem 1: in the existing filtering schemes (e.g., SEF, REFS, MDSEF, RDFS, PCREF and so 
on ), assuming the attacker has compromised Nc nodes randomly (Nc ≥ t) in the network, then the 
probability for obtaining at least t different key partitions, can be denoted as, 
 
 )/(}])()1[(),({
0
cc N
n
ti
i
j
Nji
i
j
S njiCinCP  
 
   (2) 
Proof: commanding Nc compromised nodes form a set Q1, the number of methods of selecting t 
partitions from n ones is C(n, t), and also these selected partitions form a set Q2 . Next, the 
number of methods which set Q2 form surjection to set Q1 is, 
                      
2 1
1
0
0
( , ) ( , 1) ( 1) ( , 2) ( 2)
( 1) ( , 2) 2 ( 1) ( ,1) 1
(( 1) ( , ) ( ) )
(( 1) ( , ) ( ) )
c c c
c c
c
c
N N N
N Nt t
t
Nj
j=
t
Nj
j=
C t t t C t t t C t t t
C t C t
C t t j t j
C t t j t j

 

          
       
     
     


 (3) 
The number of methods that the attacker just obtains t key partitions after randomly 
compromising Nc nodes in the network is C(n, t)
 
× φ , similarly, we can calculate the number of 
methods that the attacker just obtains t +1, t +2,…, n key partitions, so the number of methods 
that the attacker obtaining more than t partitions is, 
 
                        
0
( , ) (( 1) ( , ) ( ) )c
n i
Nj
i=t j=
C n i C i i j i j
 
      
 
                      (4) 
Obviously, the number of methods that each element in set Q1 has an image in set Q2 is n
Nc
. 
Proved.
  
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON SMART SENSING AND INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS VOL. 8, NO. 4, DECEMBER 2015 
2257
sink
compromised node
CH1
rc
S1
S2
S3
S4
S5
S8
S9
S10
S6
S7
 
Fig. 5 Comparison of SEF and MOFS’s compromise tolerance 
 
In MOFS, in order to fake unrecognized false package, the attacker has to obtain more than t 
nodes, where some node A in it, making the other compromised nodes to be neighbors of A. For 
example, when t is equal to 5, after compromising A6 and its neighbors A7,…, A10 in Fig. 5, the 
adversary is able to fake a false package with the Cos A6 and additional 5 correct MACs through 
A6,…，A10 , finally, all forwarding nodes and sink can’t filter out the false package. 
Therom2: assuming the attacker obtains Nc (Nc ≥ t) nodes in the network randomly, the 
probability that existing more than t such nodes (there is some node A, making the other t-1 nodes 
are all neighbors of A) is, 
)()
2
( cMOFS
c rPP
r
P                                                (5) 
Here p(µ) is, 



c
c
N
ti
Nii
c ZZiNC }])/(1[)/(),({
22               (6) 
Proof: assuming that the area of the network is Z, and then every node has a probability πµ2 / Z to 
distribute in the spherical zone M with a radius µ. Therefore, the probability of just existing t 
compromised nodes in the zone M is pb = C(Nc, t) ×
 
(πµ2 / Z)t × (1- πµ2 / Z)Nc . Therefore, the 
probability of obtaining more than t nodes in the certain zone with a radius of µ is p(µ). 
Making event g signifies this: among y (t ≤ y ≤ Nc) nodes, there is some node A, whose distances 
between the other y -1 nodes are all less than the communication radius rc . Making event g0 
signifies this: y nodes belong to a same zone with a radius of rc /2. Making event g1 signifies this: 
y nodes belong to a same zone with a radius of rc. Obviously, we can get g from g0, and also can 
get g0 from g1. Proved. 
ZHAO Jing-Guo, LUO Qing-Yun and Liu Zhi-Xiong, A MAC AND ONE-WAY FUNCTION BASED FILTERING SCHEME
2258
30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Compromised nodes' number
P
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
 t
o
 b
re
a
k
 t
h
e
 s
c
h
e
m
e
 
 
P
S
(theory)
P
S
(experiment)
P
r
c
/2
(theory)
P
r
c
(theory)
P
M
(experiment)
 
Fig. 6  Theoretic and experimental results of pSEF、pMOFS 
 
Fig. 6 draws the theoretical analysis curve and simulation result of pSEF and pMOFS, here t is set to 
5, rc is 2.5 meters, n is equal to 15 and the network radius is set to 25 meters (simulation result is 
the average value from 2000 randomly tests under the same parameter settings). As is shown in 
Fig. 6, after obtaining little nodes, the attacker is able to break down SEF in a higher probability. 
However, in order to break down MOFS, it needs more compromised nodes. For example, when 
Nc is equal to 20, the probability that the attacker breaking down SEF is 98.9%, for MOFS, the 
probability is 0.02%. Therefore, from theoretical analysis and experiment result analysis, we can 
know that the compromise tolerate ability of MOFS is far better than SEF. 
 
b. Filtering probability 
 
Firstly, we analyze the ability of filtering false data in MOFS. Assuming the attacker obtains 
certain node A and A’s Nd -1 neighbors. If Nd is more than t, the attacker can randomly forge 
unrecognized false packages. If Nd is less than t, the attacker must fake MACs and hash values of 
t - Nd neighbors of A. Because node Ai stores key and hash value of a neighbor node of the source 
node A with probability ci / c0, so the probability that the attacker can check up one of these t - Nd 
nodes is,  
0
_
0( ) 1
d
b i
t N c i
p =
num S c
 


                                         (7) 
The probability that the false package is filtered within H hops is, 
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                                             0
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( ) 1 (1 )
( ) 1
H
d
b
j
t N c j
p H
num S c
 
   

                       (8) 
We then analyze the ability of filtering outdated data in MOFS. Assuming the compromised node 
A injects an outdated data Ra into the network. Making the number of neighbor nodes of A is 
num(A), the number of hops from A to sink is c0, the number of hops from Ai to sink is ci(1≤ i ≤ 
d). Obviously, ci is equal to c0 minus i .Therefore, the probability that the intermediate node Ai can 
check up the hash value of one out of these t nodes in the outdated package is, 
0
_
0( ) 1
a i
c it
p =
num S c



                                     (9) 
 Since every forwarding node can filter Ra with a probability pa_i , the probability that the 
outdated package being filtered within H hops is, 
0
_
1 1 0
( ) 1 (1 ) 1 (1 )
( ) 1
H H
a a j
j j
c jt
p H p
num S c 

      

     (10) 
As is shown in Fig. 7 which draws the curves that both of outmoded package and false package 
changing according to the transmission hops H, (Nd =3, c0 = 20, num(S) =8，t =5). We can know 
from Fig. 7, MOFS can filter outdated package and false package with a higher probability 
simultaneously. For example, the proportions those within the first 5 hops to filter outdated 
package and fake package are 96.3% and 64%, respectively. Along with the increasing of the 
transmission hops, the filtering proportion is getting bigger and bigger, (all outdated package is 
filtered in the first 8 hops, and about 95% of the false package is filtered in the first 20 hops). 
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Fig. 7 The probability of MOFS to filter false and outdated package 
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c. Energy consumption 
 
The energy which is used up by MOFS chiefly comes from: (1) in the initial stage of deployment, 
the expense that each node selects neighbor information, builds the transmission path to sink and 
distributes neighbor information to intermediate nodes; (2) the expense that transmission nodes 
check up MACs and hash values; (3) the expense that intermediate nodes transmit data package. 
In stage 1, interactive data package among nodes is short and lasts only little time. While in stage 
2, the expense of MAC and hash value calculating is far less than data transmission. As a result, 
the expense of both stage 1 and stage 2 could be ignored. 
Making Lr signifies the length of data package without adopting any safe mechanism, Ln signifies 
the length of node ID, Li signifies the length of the key’s index, Lk signifies the length of hash 
value’s index and Ls signifies the length of the Bloom Filter. Then the length of data package in 
the MOFS and SEF respectively could be signified by Lr0 = Lr + 2Ls + (Ln + Lk)t, Lr1 = Lr + Ls + 
tLi. For example, when Lr is 24bytes, Ln is 10bits, Li is 10bits, Lk is 10bits and Ls is 64bits, Lr0 and 
Lr is 52.45bytes and 38.27bytes, respectively. Obviously, comparing to SEF, the extra load in 
data package of MOFS will lead to the increase of transmission energy, but given to the 
capability that MOFS is able to filter out false and outdated data, the extra expense above could 
be tolerated. In addition, if the attacker injects false and outdated data into the network, 
comparing to SEF, MOFS can save more energy through filtering them as soon as possible. And 
we will check up it in the partition of simulation experiment. The equation behind illustrates the 
expense of transmitting”1 false data + β outdated data” for H hops: 
 
0
1 1
0 _ _ _ _
2 21 1
[(1 ( (1 )) ( (1 ))]
i iH H
r b i b j a i a j
i ij j
E L i p p i p p
 
  
              (11) 
 
d. Expense of storage 
 
In MOFS, each node needs to store a pre-distributed key, a one-way hash chain with length u, all 
upstream nodes’ neighbor information and keys and hash values for part of the upstream nodes. 
For example, assuming a network with an area of 60×60m2, where randomly deploying 500 
nodes whose radius are all 2.3m. Then the average number of neighbor nodes of a node is 7 and 
the average number of paths is 38. When the length of a key is 64bits, length of node ID is 10 
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bits, length of hash value is 64bits and the corresponding index is 19 bits, it requires a storage 
need of 2.1KB. As the mainstream nodes (e.g., the MICA2 node developed by UCB) equips more 
than 3 KB SRAM and 128KB ROM, and thus can meet the requirements obviously. 
 
e. Simulation experiment 
 
We build the simulated platform through C language, and the results are averaged from 10 
simulation experiments. The simulation environment is as follows: in a 50×50m
2
 square network 
area, randomly distributes 500 sensors, a static source node and a sink node are located in the 
sides of the area, respectively; the expense of transmitting and accepting data package of SEF is 
60mW and 12mW respectively, and the expense of transmitting and accepting a MOFS data 
package is 81mW, 16mW, respectively; the communication radius and perception radius are 
2.5m and 5m respectively. 
As is shown in Fig. 8, we can know the change of filtering probability along with the 
transmission hops H when the number of compromise nodes is 15. As is shown below: 
 (1)MOFS could filter false and outdated packages with higher probabilities, e.g., the filtering 
proportion in the first 5 hops of the formal reach 80.3% and 96.7% respectively; along with the 
increasing of transmission hops, the probability of filtering false and outdated packages also 
increase quickly, being able to filter all false package within 19 hops and filter all outdated 
packages within 6 hops. 
(2) SEF can filter about 25% false packages in the first 5 hops , e.g., being able to filter about 
70% false packages in the first 20 hops. Because data package in the MOFS is attached with hash 
values, and thus is able to filter the outdated packages through checking up the freshness of them. 
However, SEF doesn’t attach any “time variable parameters” in the data package, so can not filter 
the outdated packages. 
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Fig. 8 Filtering probability P changes according to H 
As is shown in Fig. 9, we can know the change of data transmission expense along with the 
transmitting hops H when the number of compromise nodes Nc is equal to 15. As is shown below: 
(1) expense of SEF transmitting 100 false packages magnify with the increasing of transmitting 
hops, e.g., the expense of the first 7 transmitting hops is 3.34Joules and the expense of the first 20 
transmitting hops is 9.48Joules; while at the same condition, the expense in the MOFS is much 
less, e.g., the expense of the first 6 transmitting hops is 1.49Joules, and after transmitting for 6 
hops, the expense don’t magnify any more because all false packages are filtered.  
(2) The expense of SEF transmitting 100 outdated packages magnify with the increasing of 
transmitting hops. For example, when transmitting 20 hops, E is equal to 14.5Joules. However, at 
the same conditions, transmitting more than 6 hops, E is equal to 2.2Joules in the MOFS. 
 
0 5 10 15 20
3
6
9
12
15
Transmitted hops H
E
n
e
rg
y
 c
o
n
s
u
m
p
ti
o
n
 E
(J
o
u
le
s
)
 
 
SEF(false package)
SEF(outdated package)
MOFS(false package)
MOFS(outdated package)
 
Fig. 9 E changes according to H 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
False and outdated data will incur false alarms and waste the limited energy in the network. This 
paper proposed a MAC and one-way function based scheme to defend them simultaneously. The 
novel solution is to bind the keys of nodes to their locations, and check the legitimacy of the 
locations of the endorsing nodes, and each node distributes its key and initial hash value to some 
other nodes after deployment. When a report is generated for an observed event, it must carry the 
MACs and fresh hash values from t detecting nodes. During forwarding, each node checks the 
legitimacy of the relative position of the detecting nodes carried in the report, the correctness of 
the MACs and hash values, and the freshness of these hash values, respectively. As for future 
work, we plan to extend our research results to mobile sink or multiple sinks situations. 
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